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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
John A. Chernak*
Police Officer Who Makes False Arrest
Pursuant to Reasonable Information Not
Liable for Damages in Action for False Arrest
and Imprisonment-Pennsylvania State Police
sent a teletype message to Cleveland, Ohio,
police department requesting a confidential
check on the person named and described.
After an answer was made to this request a
second message arrived requesting the Cleveland Police to take the subject into custody,
stating that a warrant had been issued for the
arrest of the person and that the Pennsylvania
authorities would extradite if necessary. Defendant officers were ordered to arrest the
suspect, which they did over his protest. Approximately eleven days later it was determined
that the suspect was not the man wanted and
his case was dismissed. He thereupon brought
an action for false arrest and imprisonment.
The trial court held for the plaintiff, but a
subsequent appeal reversed the trial court and
the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the reversal. Johnsan v. Reddy, 126 N.E.2d 911
(1955). Balancing the right of an individual
to be free from unlawful arrest and seizure
against the public interest in safeguarding the
community from felons who have sought
refuge there, the court said: "We believe that
in making an arrest without a warrant at the
request of another police agency all reasonable
doubts concerning the reasonableness of the
information on which the arresting officer acts
should be resolved in his favor." On the facts
of this case, the court felt that the defendants
were entitled to an instruction that they had
acted upon reasonable information and thus
were not liable in damages to the plaintiff.
However, the case was remanded for a retrial
on the issue of whether or not the defendants
* Senior Law Student, Northwestern University
School of Law.

had acted with "all practicable speed" in
filing a complaint and warrant against the
plaintiff. This is a question for the jury and
the burden of proving the justification for any
delay in filing the complaint and warrant is on
the police officer.

Requirements for Admissibility of Tape
Recorded Confession Examined by Alabama
Court of Appeals-Defendant's conviction of
murder in the second degree was reversed on
the ground that the state had failed to explain
satisfactorily why the jury had been separated
during the course of the trial. However, in the
course of its opinion the court had occasion to
discuss at length the requirements of admissibility of a tape recorded confession. Wright
v. State, 79 S.2d 66 (1955). Although a partially
inaudible recorded confession had been admitted over objection in the instant case, the
court did not decide whether or not this constituted error in view of the fact that it had
reversed on another point. Since the case was
being remanded for a new trial, the court made
a number of general observations on the requirements for the admissibility of such
evidence. The primary requirements are that
the accuracy of the recording device, the
recording and the voluntary nature of the
confession must first be established. The specific
question to which the court directed its attention was the admissibility of a tape recorded
confession, portions of which were inaudible for
one reason or another, and upon this point
the court outlined some general rules. Since
the sound of the accused's voice will have a
great impact on the jury it is apparent that all
material statements must be accurately recorded and an instruction by the court cannot
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cure a material defect if it exists in the recording. However, since the audible portions of the
recording may be of material value, the court
should first listen to a play-back out of the
presence of the jury, giving defense counsel
opportunity to interpose appropriate objections
at that time. During this proceeding a transcript
of the audible portions should be kept. If the
record is inaudible in any material portion, it
should be rejected in its entirety unless other
competent evidence is supplied to remedy the
defect. In this regard testimony of witnesses
present at the time the recording was made
may be admitted and the entire recording, even
though partially inaudible, should be admitted
as corroborative of such testimony. If the
recording contains illegal evidence, the entire
recording should be rejected, unless the illegal
portions can be erased therefrom, or kept from
the jury in some other manner, since an instruction to disregard will not cure the prejudicial
effect on the jury.
Chemical Tests for Intoxication: What
Constitutes a Refusal to Submit?-Defendant
was arrested and charged with drunken driving.
When requested to submit to a urinalysis and
blood test for intoxication he refused to do so
unless his own physician were present or would
administer the test. At the trial of the case
testimony of the police chemist as to what such
a test would disclose if properly conducted was
admitted over objection of the defense counsel.
The theory of the prosecution was that the
refusal to submit to the test was a proper foundation for an inference of an admission of guilt.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio held
that the admission of this testimony constituted prejudicial error. City of Columbus v.
Mullins, 123 N.E.2d 422 (1954). Conceding
that under the amended Ohio Constitution it is
proper for the prosecuting attorney to comment
on the defendant's failure to testify in his own
behalf, the court concluded that the analogy
did not follow under the circumstances in this
case. Since the defendant had not refused to
take the tests, but had merely requested that
his physician be present, the burden was upon
the prosecution to show that this request
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was tantamount to a refusal. "In our opinion
... defendant's request.., did not.., amount
to such a refusal as would give counsel for the
prosecution the right to assert that the refusal
amounted to an admission of guilt, nor would it
give the jury or the court the right to so consider it."
California Supreme Court Adopts Federal
Exclusionary Rule--Defendant was convicted
of conspiring to engage in horse-race bookmaking and related offenses. The bulk of the
evidence introduced at the trial, over objection
of the defendant, was obtained by use of dictographic devices installed in private homes
pursuant to an authorization issued by the
Chief of Police of the City of Los Angeles.
Apparently without ruling as to whether or not
the evidence had been illegally obtained the
trial judge admitted it, over objection of the
defendant, following the established practice
under the California non-exclusionary rule. On
appeal the Supreme Court of California reversed the conviction, and changed its own
prior rulings by holding that evidence illegally
seized should be rejected by the courts of
California. In other words, California has now
joined the group of states following the Federal
exclusionary rule. People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905
(1955) (4-3 decision).
In an exhaustive survey, the majority opinion
proceeded to examine the ramifications of the
Federal exclusionary rule. Observing that in a
long line of decisions the Supreme Court of the
United States has established the proposition
that the Fourth Amendment is enforceable
against the states through the due process
clause of the Fourteenth, but that these provisions do not expressly exclude evidence obtained in controvention of their mandates, the
court reexamined its non-exclusionary rule in
light of the invitation extended to state courts
to do so in Wolf v. Colorado,338 U.S. 25 (1949).
It concluded that the "minimal standards"
of due process had not been met in the instant
case. A survey of opinions both pro and con
revealed that a majority of the state courts and
most of the outstanding scholars of criminal
jurisprudence were aligned in support of ad-
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mitting illegally seized evidence. Summarizing
the arguments in support of the majority position, the court found that such evidence is
normally admitted because it is "ordinarily
just as true and reliable as evidence lawfully
obtained"; it does not protect a defendant from
the illegal act which has already occurred; it
benefits only the criminal who is allowed to
escape by reason of a technical rule of evidence;
it does not punish the officers who have violated
the law; it allows known criminals to remain at
large to plague society solely because of a
"blunder" of the law enforcement officer; it is
inconstant, inconsistent and easily circumvented in actual operation; and, finally, does
not tend to prevent unreasonable searches and
seizures. '"espite the persuasive force of the
foregoing arguments, we have concluded that
evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional guarantees is inadmissible.... We have
been compelled to reach that conclusion because other remedies have completely failed to
secure compliance with the constitutional
provisions on the part of police officers. ..."
Furthermore, to continue to admit such evidence merely serves as an impetus to police
officers to continue such practices which are
but one degree removed from unlawful conduct
connected with the actual trial of a case. Since
other remedies have failed to deter police officers
from conducting illegal searches and seizures
the adoption of the exclusionary rule will impel
these officers to rely on legal means to secure
their objective of bringing criminals to justice.
The court frankly admits that the rule it adopts
is no panacea and that illegal searches and
seizures will continue to arise in the courts,
but concludes that a rigid enforcement of exclusion will bring public opinion to bear on the
lawless actions of police officers and will preclude the charge that the courts are, in effect,
parties to such practices by condoning them in
legal proceedings. To the argument that enforcement officers do not always have a choice
between proceeding legally or illegally in
apprehending criminals or in obtaining evidence
the court demonstrates that this is merely an
objection to the constitutional provisions themselves and one which cannot be entertained by

the court, which is sworn to uphold the constitution. Concluding that its opinion establishes
a judicially-created rule of evidence the court
states: "[T]his court is not bound by the decisions that have applied the federal rule, and if
it appears that those decisions have developed
needless refinements and distinctions, this court
need not follow them.... Under these circumstances the adoption of the exclusionary rule
need not introduce confusion into the law of
criminal procedure. Instead it opens the door
to the development of workable rules governing
searches and seizures and the issuance of warrants that will protect both the rights guaranteed by the constitutional provisions and the
interest of society in the suppression of crime."
A strong dissent deplored the rule declared
by the majority opinion. Conceding for purposes of argument that "the illegality in obtaining the evidence was both clear and flagrant"
the dissent noted that there was no doubt as to
the guilt of the defendant. This, to the dissent,
demonstrated the inherent anamoly in the rule
adopted by the majority. While purporting to
adopt this new rule for the protection of society
against infringement of their constitutional
guarantees, in reality "the main beneficiaries of
the adoption of the exclusionary rule will be
those members of the underworld who prey
upon law-abiding citizens through their criminal
activities. It further appears that the... rule
will inevitably lead to unnecessary confusion,
delay and inefficiency in the administration of
justice.., the price that society must pay for
the adoption of... a rule of uncertain nature
and doubtful value which is 'no more than a
mild deterrent at best."' Although the majority stated that the rule "opens the door to
the development of workable rules" it nowhere
suggests how these rules will be formulated or
how confusion will be avoided. Manifestly,
"the exclusionary rule, in the many ramifications of its application to innumerable factual
situations, is fraught with such difficulty as to
make the formation of satisfactory, certain
and workable rules a practical impossibility."
The majority opinion is based on a policy
evaluation weighing advantages and disadvantages, is not compelled by any constitutional
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mandate, adopts an "uncharted course" which
the legislature has frequently declined to consider and "'deprives society of its remedy
against one lawbreaker because he has been
pursued by another.'"
A brief filed in support of the state's petition
for rehearing by the City Attorney and Chief of
Police of Los Angeles sets out in detail the
consternation with which the Cahan decision
was received by law enforcement agencies of
the state. The brief points out that on the
basis of constructions being placed upon the
decision by lower courts and prosecutors the
issue is "whether man's basic freedoms, to
devote himself to productive work, to live in
peace and safety with his family and to have
security against men of violence and cupidity,
are to be nullified through academic determinations,... no matter what the cost to
orderly society and to its useful citizens." The
Cahan opinion is characterized as having "an
extraordinary impact. . . upon the operations
and effectiveness of the Los Angeles Police
Department and of other law enforcement
agencies and officers throughout this state." A
substantial part of the brief seeks to establish
that the true facts of the case were not before
the court, with the result that both the majority and minority were under the impression
that Los Angeles police officers have a "callous
disregard" for constitutional rights of others.
This alone should justify a rehearing for the
purpose of clarification, if not for complete retraction of the decision itself. To allow the
case to stand as it presently does will have a
serious detrimental effect on efficient enforcement of law and order in Los Angeles, since its
literal effect has been construed to impose
greater limitations on law enforcement officers
than those imposed on ordinary citizens.
William H. Parker, the Chief of Police, demonstrates in a forceful and convincing manner that
if the court truly means to enforce its words
according to their literal meaning that an appreciable number of criminals will never be
brought to justice and that the every day
duties of police officers, even when entirely disconnected from uncovering crime, will be seriously hampered. By way of illustration a widely
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publicized suicide attempt by a Hollywood
actress is cited. The attempt was foiled by
quick action on the part of two police officers
who, on the basis of a telephone call from the
actress' mother, sped out to the actress' home,
forced their way in without warrant, took the
woman, some empty bottles, etc., to a hospital
where her stomach was pumped, etc. After
setting out the facts, Chief Parker notes that
under the Cahan ruling the officers were guilty
of trespass, burglary, disturbing the peace,
forcible entry of a dwelling house and destruction of property, detention of a person against
his will, dispossession of a person from his
habitation, kidnapping, false imprisonment,
assault, battery and several violations of the
vehicle code, not to mention provisions of the
Federal Civil Rights Act. Anticipating that this
illustration will be attacked as being an absurd
supposition, Chief Parker points out that the
Cahan and other opinions of the federal courts
have not limited their language in any respect
and even if it be conceded that no prosecution
would be brought or conviction obtained, the
point is that officers are sworn to uphold the
law. Since the law states, under petitioner's
construction of the Cahan decision, that a
police officer must look to a particular statute
for definitive authority before doing any act in
execution of his duties, even where it involves
such humanitarian principles as the prevention
of a suicide, there will be no possibility of action
in cases similar to the one cited and in many
others with even more serious consequences.
Chief Parker concludes: "If we, who are
earnestly and sincerely trying to do our duty
in a lawful and efficient manner, who have been
repeatedly cited as the model large police force
in this nation, who have enjoyed public support
to a degree that, if equalled, is not surpassed
by any comparable department in the country,
if we, despite our efforts to conform, are nevertheless acting in a manner that impels the
highest Court of the State to subject us to public
censure, then I submit that it is a matter of
greatest urgency that we be supplied at the
earliest date and with the greatest detail consistent with judicial propriety, with standards
sufficient to permit my men to guide their
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conduct with a reasonable certainty that they
are protected in their performance of
their duty."
For the first judicial application of the
Cahan ruling, see Peoplev.Berger, 282 P.2d 509
(Calif. 1955) (abstracted in the Criminal Law

Case Notes and Comments section of this
issue). See, generally, Allen, Due Process and
State Crimintal Procedures: Another Look, 48
NW. U.L. REV. 16 (1953); Comment, The
Federal Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule,
45 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 51 (1954).

